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If you are on the left, and especially if you are a Marxist, you are not
supposed to be desirous--of sex, cars, or Cuisinarts. An austere life is
recommended for the revolutionary, who is to be both lean and mean--sort of
an ascetic Rambo. Those who accumulate goods beyond their basic needs are
regarded with suspicion and often loathing. But what are basic needs?
Remember that Marx, himself, said that human needs are infmitely
expandable (Marx 1973/1844). And remember, too, that one central goal of
Marx's revolution was to enable the proletariat to live like the bourgeoisie.
Even so, consumption is still in bad odor on the left.
Who in their right minds are not distressed by the fact that the
publisher/financier Malcolm Forbes spent between $2-3 million for his
Moroccan birthday party in 1989? The excesses of Donald Trump are legend,
but he has his counterparts in Japan, England, West Germany, and
Switzerland. There are greedy people all over the globe; it takes no effort to
find them. It is easy to condemn consumption, not just because of what people
do now, but because of its history. In the popular mind, Rome fell because a
ruling class was more concerned with circuses than production. In the court
cultures of early modern Europe, aristocratic men and women were
encouraged to consume with style and grace. When consumption became
excessive, it was linked to moral excess, causing the (often Puritanical) lower
orders to look upon the unfolding spectacle of consumption with disgust. And,
finally, consumption is seen as a feminine activity, and therefore one to be
treated as frivolous and meaningless (Mukerji 1989, p. 1462).
Marx viewed consumption negatively because it led to alienation among
people. The more you consume, the less human you are. In a nicely
paradoxical relationship, each act of consumption eats away at the soul. How?
Marx explains, in his well-known discussion of commodity fetishism (Marx
1977/1896). In capitalist societies, workers sell their labor power, and produce
commodities, over which they have no control, for exchange. Commodities,
be they cars or refrigerators, appear to have intrinsic characteristics, such as
weight, color, and size, and they also have a price. Prices are determined by
market forces (supply and demand, the cost of labor and materials). Price
determines what gets produced as well as how goods are distributed. Goods
which bring a high price/profit will be produced, as opposed to those which
might meet a greater social need. Prices determine who gets what. The wages
paid to the men or women who sell their labor power, determine how much
power people have, how much they can buy of the very goods they have
produced. Thus, relationships between people are determined by the prices
of commodities. Relationships between people--the flesh and blood that
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created the commodities--are presented as relationships between things. As
people enter the marketplace, they confront their own alienated labor in the
form of the commodity. The commodity, its price, and market relationships
all appear as "normal," independent of human activity. Hidden behind the
commodity form, however, are the historical struggle of the bourgeoisie and
proletariat, the surplus value that has been expropriated, and the relationship
of exploitation and domination that characterizes capitalism. It is only by
understanding all this, says Marx, that people can understand that their
economic order is not inevitable, that it was produced by real people, who can
create new orders. That, of course, was why he began Volume I of Capital
with a discussion of commodities.
These insights have effected the defmitions of class that flow from Marx
(see, for instance, the work of Wright 1978, 1985). Exploitation is
char~cteri~tic of capitalism and occurs, first, at the point of production. One's
relationship to the means of production is the primary determinant of political
and economic power, and by extension, one's self. Marx, drawing on Hegel,
argues that people realize themselves as human beings through
transformations of the material world, though laboring. Thus, most Marxist
and neo-Marxist class theorists, who are bent on mapping the contemporary
class structure of American society, set out to define people's class position by
privileging production, by looking at whether or not people control others, or
are controlled by them (Abercrombie and Urry 1983; Burawoy 1979; Carchedi
1977; Wright 1978, 1985). The job people have, or do not have, becomes the
determining variable for categorizing them and others like them. Gone from
the picture are such Weberian concerns as status and style of life.
It is my contention that the failure of a Marxist framework to deal
se~?usly with the issue of consumption is a major problem, and limits our
ability to understand the class structure of contemporary societies. Maybe
prod~ction is no longer central to people's lives and the development of social
relations, Maybe Marx needs to be updated. Now, and I think this needs to
be made c!e~, I :un not arguing that we do not live in a class society, or that
all that distinguIShes' one person from another is whether they drive a'
Chevrolet or a Porsche, drink Bud or Perrier. Exploitation is still a key
element 'of modem society; there are still 'class 'struggles. But the struggle is .
over consumption. The struggle is over money, the power to consume, and
not whether a person does or does not own the means of production a
concept of increasingly dubious value. '
~t us think for a moment about conte~poraryAmerica without a priori
theories, ~at do we make of the fact that in some neighborhoods, women
have ~rgamzed coupon clubs for the purpose of alerting one another to
bargams at local stores, and trading coupons? Who hasn't been told, '1 could
have gotten it for you. wholesale," or at least, '1 know somebody who could
have go.tteo a deal 00 It.for you." Yuppies, the old rich, garage mechanics and
housewives are all lookmg for a good deal. And why not? Shopping smart is
not necessarily a sign that one has bought into consumer culture--after all
we do have to eat and provide ourselves with shelter. But people derive reai
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gratification and even a sense of self worth, even if those on the left don't
think they should, from being intelligent consumers. Isn't ConsumerReports
produced for the sole purpose of making it possible to buy the right stereo,
bike, back packing equipment, blender, and -toaster, and getting the right
price? It seems to me that what theleft often worries about, but doesn't say,
is that people don't consume the right things. The idea that the working class
mind is numbed to the possibilities of revolution by beer and chips is not
entirely plausible. Is the desire of a working-class family to own a washer,
dryer, refrigerator, television set, and car really a sign that they are engaged
in some form of mindless hedonism?
Madonna sings, "I'm just a material girl." Bumper stickers proclaim:
'When the tough gets going, the tough go shopping." "Born to shop." '1 brake
for garage sales." 'Who ever has the most toys when he dies, wins." "Spending
our children's inheritance," which usually appears on Winnebagoes or their
clones. "Shop 'til you drop." Come on, America, consumption is full. It is the
reason why people work. Should people, who are weary from dull jobs, be
denied the pleasure which is to be found in consumption? Might consumption
even, dare we say this word, be meaningful?
It is time again for theory. Remember that Marx borrowed his concept
of the laboring human being, realizing her or himself through work and
transformation of the material world, from Hegel. Marx believed that people
overcame alienation through work that allowed them to realize their full
human potential. (He did not mean factory labor [Marx 1973/1844].) If we
stick to the original insight, borrowed from Hegel, we can hold fast to the idea
that people realize their unique natures, become part of larger communities,
overcome their alienation, materially. The subject and object are, as dialectics
tells us, wedded, not two separate phenomenon. People are social animals;
that is what it means to be human in both a Hegelian and Marxian sense--to
realize one's fullness, and to achieve full ego development, through
membership in and identification with a larger human community. How, in
fact, do people do this? Through, I am arguing, the use and manipulation of
artifacts (material objects) that have social meaning or have social meanings
imparted to them (cf., Miller 1987, pp. 3-17; 178-217). Thus, objects produced
in one setting (which mayor may not represent alienated labor) can be
appropriated and used in another setting to realize oneself, to identify with a
larger community, to overcome alienation. In short, people and cultures learn
about who they are through the objects they produce and consume.
The clearest memories I have of my father during the time I was growing
up are, I think, an illustration of my point. Over the course of his life he had
a variety of different jobs, most of them, by his own testimony, not very
interesting. He worked hard and spent his leisure time, such as it was, "fixing-
up" the house. In fact, "fixing-up" the houses we lived in was his consuming
activity and passion. He laid patios and sidewalks, put in new bathrooms,
made an attic over into a master bedroom (though there was no such term
then), rebuilt a garage to make a study for me, planted shrubs, painted, moved
doorways, enclosed porches, made ponds and grottoes and other things I have
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long forgotten. His sense of self, though you will have to take my word for
this, was defmed not by the jobs he had--he was, at different times, a farmer,
small-businessman, manager, and blue-collar worker--but by his work around
the house. My mother, who was a special-education teacher, complained about
her work and made it clear, like my father, that the reason they worked was
to have a nice home, and to be able to fill it up with things that symbolized
to themselves, their relatives, and the neighbors that they were respectable,
middle-class people.
While my father was puttering around the house, and my mother was
canning, washing clothes, or working in the garden, 1 usually played. But as
I approached my sixteenth birthday all of my interests and energies were
focused around one, all-consuming goal: owning that' 'symbol of alienated
labor, an automobile. I had already worked two summers picking berries and
in a greenhouse, to get enough money to buy a car. 1 pestered my father
continually until he agreed that I could get one a full three months before I
turned sixteen. 1 backed it in and out of the driveway, washed and polished
it, had new naugahyde seatcovers installed, replaced the old hubcaps with full
moons, bullnosed the front end (which means, to the uninitiated, that I took
off the hood ornament and put on a rounded piece of chrome), leaded the
trunk lid, and had the car repainted. In short, I made the car mine. Why did
I spend all that time on the car, why did I covet it so? Because a car, an
object, meant that I could date without having to tag along with somebody
older; it meant that I no longer had to ride the school bus; it meant that I
could visit my friends who lived some distance away (I went to a rural
consolidated high school); it meant, above all, that I was no longer a kid. My
parents, of course, had different ideas, but that is beside the point. My self was
created through the use of material objects that had a distinct cultural
meaning. By owning a car, I became a member of a larger community--albeit
of high school teenagers. There can, then, be a positive relationship between
people and things.
There are two points to make about this observation. The first involves
a basic sociological insight: our selves are not given; they are socially
constructed and objects play a part in that construction. The second point is
that' we do not always use objects in the construction' oftheself in the way in
which they were originally intended. The meaning of the first point can be
clarified by a cross-cultural example. Strathern (1979) has discussed the
meaning of face painting among the New Guinea highlanders. For the New
Guinea highlander the face that one is born with is an arbitrary matter.
Whether or not it is handsome by our standards is beside the point. The face
is not a representation of the real self. The real self is revealed only after the
face has been worked upon, through the elaborate use of cosmetics and line
drawings. From our perspective, the highlander is "made up." From the
highlander's perspective, he or she is laying bare his or her soul before the
world, once the make-up is applied. Furthermore, and this is partial support
for our second point, the objects used to decorate the body and reveal the self
may be feathers or shells, they may be purchased with cash or the traditional
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salt, feathers may be obtained with the use of bow and arrow, or birds brought
down with guns. The meaning of the object is determined by its use andsocial
context; it is not predetermined. .
More on the second point, because it deserves elaboration. From a
Marxian perspective, consumption is seen as a passive act. If agency is
involved at all, it is because people are seen as dupes wandering dazedly and
forlornly up and down the isles of K-Mart and Wal-Mart, ever searching for
and never fmding their communal selves. But that is not how most people
consume. Take the example of teenagers buying records and tapes, a multi-
billion dollar a year business. Youth use the music they buy in many ways: to
listen to in solitude, to drown out their parents, to organize parties around,
and in order to be able to talk to one another about the music and the
individuals and groups who create and perform it. As Grossberg (1988,·p. 140)
tells us, they seldom use it in any straightforward manner. "[T]heir power lies
in their ability to appropriate any text, to undermine the distinction between
production and consumption and, in this way, to deny the power of ideology
and of the commodity itself."
A gift is an object, which in one context may represent pure alienated
labor, as would be the flowers sent to the United States from Columbia,
where they are grown and picked by underpaid laborers. Maybe we are
reminded by an advertisement to purchase flowers for our mother, father, or
sweetheart, but once we do so, and once we give them away, the flowers take
on a new, social meaning. We have used the purchase of a commodity to
forge a social bond. Cynical as some may be about birthdays, Christmas,
Hanukkah, or anniversaries, the fact remains that the gifts that are given and
received have a meaning that transcends the object. "It's the thought that
counts."The meaning of objects is determined by a social and cultural context.
We appropriate objects and recontextualize them. My fast car, a 1948
Plymouth, was designed as an efficient means of family transportation. It had
a different meaning for me, just as today's low-riders or the custom cars of the
1960s, had a different meaning for their owners than the one originally
intended. . _ '. '.
Let us return to the isles of Wal-Mart. Granted that some people may
fill up' their carts up with- things they could do without; many people shop at
Wal-Mart, and not its upscale equivalent, because that is where they can
afford to shop. And, a lot of what people have in their carts are socks, shirts,
and kitchenware, which I doubt even Marx would deny them. But people who
buy goods are not just meeting a basic need for food, shelter, or warmth. They
are also signaling to others such important things as whether or not they are
good housewives, or whether or not they are good providers. We actively
purchase and consume, engage in display of our goods, as a way of "telling"
people who we are, or who we wish to become. I know my parents and others
of their generation are not the only people who have sent snapshots of their
new breakfast buffet or refrigerator to their distant children, because my
younger friends have suffered through the same experience. A trip home is
a visit to new goods or projects and a dutiful tour around the house and yard.
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It still drives me crazy, but the reason for the display is pretty clear: the use
of and manipulation of goods, often in ways probably not intended by the
manufacturers, signals success in a desirable social role. A new freezer or
refrigerator means meals and cookies can be made and stored for the return
of children and grandchildren, because that is what grandmothers do. The
object helps the individual to realize and fulfill an important idea of self.
Consumption aids in the construction of community, whether we are
talking about consumer durables or ideology, which comes to us in the form
of radio, television and the movies. In spite of tomes written to the contrary,
watching television is not just a passive act. People appropriate the scripts,
criticize them, and chew them over with co-workers and family members.
Except for those with severe mental handicaps, people don't take television
seriously. That is, they understand it is not real, though they do use it to
construct the social, and to defme cohorts, including generational cohorts.
Factory and office workers may discuss in great detail a televised baseball or
football game, the plot of a favorite soap opera, or what happened on "Dallas"
or "Dynasty."Retirees .may talk about golf, and teenagers may discuss MTV.
All are likely to discuss the news. The fact that theorists might not like mass
culture is neither here nor there. Watching TV is not qualitatively different
from elite intellectual activity, if we are thinking about the construction of
everyday reality. The first academic department of which I was a member had
a morning ritual that involved talking about the New York Times. One
prodded colleagues to see if they had read the same story as you, what they
had made of it, and so forth. If you had not read the paper, you either had
to fake it, or avoid your colleagues. Those who did not participate in the
morning ritual were not part of the "group."
Perhaps I can sum up. When Marx wrote, production was central to
people's lives. Now, I am suggesting, our selves are not formed at the point
of production but at the point of consumption. Today's struggles are not over
who shall control the means of production, they are over whether or not
people will have the money to live a decent life. This is, of course, a strong
argument. Halle (1984) has argued that there are three sites in which people's
identify is formed: at work, in the community, and in the home, I do not wish
to deny the importance of:the job, but from my perspectivewe would do well
to consider how much people get paid, rather than dwell on whether or not
they control other workers, or whether they work with their heads or their
hands. Neighborhoods in America are stratified less by race than by income.
Whether or not one maintains an upper-, middle-, or lower-class life style
depends on income, not just the kind of job one has (Ehrenrich 1989).
Furthermore, it is not at the point of production that class and inequality
reproduce themselves: it is in the educational system, and educational
opportunities are, overwhelmingly, determined by financial status. There is a
widening gap in American society; a gap between those who can live well, and
those who cannot. We need no elaborate measures to gauge people's relative
positions. We can rely on the those two shop-worn variables of 1950s and
1960s stratification researchers: education and income.
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Again, this is not to reduce struggle and exploitation to a matter of style-
of-life. It is to see consumption as a relevant and meaning activity; to
understand that today's class battles and power struggles are over
consumption. Seldom is political and class conflict directed against the
capitalist class or employers; usually, it is aimed at a political regime (Miller
1989). Americans have politicized consumption and believe it is the
government's responsibility to make things better. It is helpful to remember
that the 1989 student pro-democracy movement in China revolved around
three basic issues: the corruption of government officials, the failure of the
government to curb inflation, and the failure of the government to provide
good jobs for university graduates (Calhoun 1989). All of these issues relate,
or can be related, to consumption. (Democracy in China did not mean, to
movement participants, that they wanted to vote in multi-party elections.)
Modern governments determine, through fiscal and monetary policies, whether
the economy grows or declines, whether women willbe able to enter the labor
force or not, whether education will be available to all, or rigidly stratified.
Americans are class-conscious, all right, but the dividing line is not the
traditional one between a class-consciousness proletariat, the middle classes,
and the bosses (cf. Vanneman and Cannon 1987). It is between the "haves"
and the "have nots," As Ernest Hemingway once explained to F. Scott
Fitzgerald's plaintive question about the rich: "The difference is that they have
money!"
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This essay is critical of traditional conceptions of organizations,
which attempt to develop models and propositions that apply to all
kinds of organizations, employ nomothetic ahistorical methods, or
assume that organizational change is an outcome of rational
managerial decisions. In contrast to these mainstream perspectives,
the theoretical framework herein is anchored in the Marxian and
radical Weberian traditions in organization theory. This essay
suggests that the need to accumulate capital and the emphasis on
cost accounting principles, to determine its income yielding power,
distinguishes profit seeking organizations from other kinds of
organizations. Moreover, the tendency of mainstream organizational
theory to assimilate Weber's distinction between substantive
rationality and formal rationality conceals the profoundly political
nature of strategic decisions, and the effects of irrationalities on
organizational change.
The study of complex organizations has been guided by rational theories
and methodologies that attempt to establish models and propositions that
apply to all organizations over an indefinite time span. In contrast, this essay:
(1) advances a conception of profit seeking organizations that articulates how
extra-organizational processes and internal irrationalities effect organizational
change, and (2) asserts that a conceptual framework that grasps the unique
characteristics of profit seeking organizations isnecessary to advance our
understanding of these kinds of organization.
The theoretical framework is anchored within the Marxian and radical .
. Weberian traditions in organizational theory. The analysis herein is Marxian
to the extent that it emphasizes internal organizational crises (e.g., Benson
1977a, 1977b; Heydebrand 1977, i985; Zeitz 1980), and the effect of capital
accumulation opportunities and constraints in the organization's economic
environment (Clegg 1981; PrecheI 1987). This conception of profit seeking
organizations also stresses the Weberian emphasis on economic considerations
in the rationalization process, and the political dimension of managerial
decision making as matters of choice rather than inevitable outcomes of
historical process (e.g., Clegg 1981; Clegg, Boerham, and Dow 1986; Clegg
and Dunkerley 1980; McNeil 1978). In addition, this essay identifies how
Weberian theory is useful to identify organizational irrationalities.
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